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INTRODUCTION
This appeal involves a refusal by the trial court to modify a
property settlement agreement executed by the parties to this
appeal and incorporated into a final Decree of Divorce entered on
January 13, 1977 (R. at 29-31).

The settlement agreement was the

product of extensive negotiation between counsel for the parties
during the course of the judicial proceeding surrounding the
divorce action.

Appellant claims that during the divorce proceed-

ings counsel for respondent and respondent made a misrepresentation
to appellant's counsel and, therefore, a modification of the
settlement agreement and the Decree of Divorce on the basis of
fraud is appropriate.
Contrary to plaintiffs assertions, the record in this matter
uncontrovertedly establishes that (1) the representation in question,
assuming arguendo that it is fraudulent, constitutes intrinsic
fraud and is an insufficient basis to set aside the final judgment
entered January 13, 1977;

(2) appellant did not rely upon the

alleged fraudulent representation and, therefore, as a matter of
law cannot prove a cause of action for fraud;

(3) the representa-

tion in question could not be relied upon as a statement of fact
since it was merely a statement of the opinion of respondent and
his attorney and, therefore, appellant cannot prove a cause of
action for fraud, and;

(4) the representation in question was both

truthful and accurate.
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By this appeal, appellant seeks assi'stance f rom th'is court .
Jr.
her efforts to set aside the final judgment entered on January ll,
1977, so she can renegotiate for the second time,!/ a more lucra-

tive settlement agreement.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since appellant's recitation of facts is incomplete, and
therefore misleading, it is necessary for respondent to recount

e/

pertinent facts relating to this appeal.
On February 15, 1979 appellant, Terry Lynne Jones, formerly
known as Terry Lynne McBride (hereinafter sometimes "Mrs. Jones"),
petitioned the trial court for an order to show cause why the
Decree of Divorce between the parties entered on January 13, 197i
should not be modified.

The petition (R. at 32-35) was supported

by the affidavit of Mrs. Jones (R. at 36-39) which alleged that t.;
division of property made by the court in the final Decree of Dive:
should be modified since the division of property was founded upor.
a stipulation between the parties which had been fraudulently
obtained by respondent, Micheal
"Mr.

w.

McBride (hereinafter sometimes

McBride").~/

1/ As more fully discussed below, an initial settlement agreement
(R. at 5-6) was set aside by stipulation when appellant retained:,
present counsel during the divorce proceedings in 1976.
2/ The affidavit of Mrs. Jones contained no allegatibon th~1f~~
Decree of Divorce entered on January 13, 1977 should e mo
based upon any need of Mrs. Jones.
And, at no time during these
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The stipulation (R. at 24-26) upon which the January 13, 1977
oecree of Divorce is founded was the product of extensive negotiation between counsel for the respective parties.

It was negotiated

totally within the context of the adversary proceedings surrounding
the divorce in question.

Indeed, the stipulation ultimately

executed by the parties was agreed to only after Mrs. Jones retained
t11e services of her present counsel to aid her in avoiding the
default to which she had earlier consented (R. at 4) and to aid
her in avoiding and renegotiating an earlier property settlement
agreement.

(R.

at 5-6)

The action for divorce in this matter was commenced in October
of 1976 when Mr. McBride filed a complaint (R. at 2-3).

Attached

to the complaint at the time of filing was an "Appearance, Acceptance
and Waiver" (R. at 4) executed by Mrs. Jones in which she acknowledged
receipt of the complaint, entered an appearance and consented that
a default be entered in accordance with the relief prayed for in
the complaint.

The complaint incorporated by reference a property

settlement agreement by which the parties agreed to distribute all
assets acquired during marriage.

This first property settlement

was never effectuated in the Decree of Divorce because Mrs. Jones

proceedings has Mrs. Jones claimed any financial need as the basis
for l1er petition for modification. Indeed, less than one month
after the Decree of Divorce at issue was entered, Mrs· Jones remarried obviating any financial assistance from Mr. McBride.
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had second thoughts about the provisions of the agreement and
sought tile advice of independent counsel to represent her during
the divorce proceeedings and to renegotiate the terms of the
settlement agreement.

Thus, on November 26, 1976 Mrs. Jones,

through her present counsel Joseph L. Henroid, subrni tted an answer
and counterclaim (R. at 15-17) which, among other things, withdre·•
her original consent to default.
Having been retained by Mrs. Jones, Mr. Henroid and his law
firm undertook to renegotiate a new property settlement agreement.
The end-product of those negotiations was the stipulation

da~d

January 13, 1977 (R. at 24-26) which was ultimately incorporated
into the Decree of Divorce.

Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the stipulatior.

provided for the distribution of all of the marital properties to
the parties and paragraph 7(d), specifically, awarded to Mr.
McBride "Stock in Land and Cattle Funding" which had been acquire:
during the period of the marriage.
After the Decree of Divorce was entered on January 13, 1977,
two years elapsed before Mrs. Jones filed the petition which give:
rise to this appeal.

The purpose of Mrs. Jones petition was to se:

aside the stipulation of the parties by which they divided the
·
·
properties acquire d d uring
marriage.

The petition recited that

1
:

was "made upon the ground and for the reason that plaintiff [duri:·
the divorce proceedings] purported to disclose all of his assets

-4-
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but failed to disclose and withheld the fact that he owned 5,000
acres located in the northern part of Utah and the southern part of
salt Lake Counties"

(R. at 32).

In the affidavit accompanying Mrs.

Jones' peitition she alleged as follows:
6.
It was represented by the plaintiff
defendant that the properties listed in
stipulation and the properties detailed
family trust were all of the properties
the parties.

to the
the
in the
owned by

7. Plaintiff failed to disclose all of his assets
and in particular failed to disclose and withheld
that fact that he owned an interest in 5,000 acres
of land located in the northern part of Utah County
and the southern part of Salt Lake County.
(R. at
37) (Emphasis added.)
Contrary to the allegations contained in her petition and the
sworn representations made in her affidavit in support of said
petition, Mrs. Jones in answer to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories admitted that she had been aware of the time of the
divorce that the parties held an interest in an entity known as
Alpine Ltd.

(which owned the 5,000 acres referred to in the petition

of Mrs. Jones) but that Mr. HcBride had represented that interest
to be worthless.

(Answer to Interrogatory l(a), R. at 69.)

Speci-

fically, in answer to Interrogatory l(a), Mrs. Jones stated that
Mr. McBride had represented "prior to the divorce that his interest

in Alpine Ltd. was worthless."

Likewise during the course of her

deposition Mrs. Jones admitted that the basis of her petition
namely that Mr. McBride had concealed the Alpine Ltd. asset -- was

-5-
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q

unfounded since she had always been aware that the parties
interest in the asset (Jones deposition pp. 37-38).

owned,

She stated,

however, that at the time of the divorce she believed the parties
interest in Alpine Ltd. had little value because it had been
transferred into Land and Cattle Funding and she knew that Land a:
Cattle Funding was having severe financial difficulty (Jones ~~
tion pp. 5-8, 13-15, 37, R. at 246-249, 254-256, 278).
When Mrs. Jones abandoned the theory alleged in her petitio~
that Mr. McBride had concealed the Alpine Ltd. asset, she insteac
advanced the theory that the value of the asset had been
sented.

misn~~

In a desperate attempt to substantiate this theory she

looked to correspondence between her counsel Mr. Henroid and Mr.
James Murphy, who represented Mr. McBride during the course of th:
divorce proceedings.

The entirety of this claim is based upon t>;

letters between Mr. Henroid and Mr. Murphy.

On November 26, 1976,

Mr. Henroid requested by letter that Mr. Murphy furnish him "wit\
list of assets in the trust with the estimated value opposite eac:
asset.
trust"

Also list any assets that the parties have outside ~e
(Jones deposition, exhibit 2, R. at 346).

In a letter dat:

December 6, 1976, Mr. Murphy provided the information which had
been requested of him (Jones deposition, exhibit 1, R. at 344- 34 i'
Trie December 6, 1976 letter from Mr. Murphy to Mr. Henroid contai:
a list of "assets not in trust" which included the following

-6-
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disclosure:

"Stock in Land and Cattle Funding.

At this time the

corporation is in very poor condition and has a negative net
worth."

That representation by Mr. Murphy is the total basis of

Mrs. Jones' claim that Mr. McBride and his attorney Mr. Murphy
fraudulently misrepresented the value of the Alpine Ltd. asset.
Mrs. Jones asserts that since the parties interest in Alpine Ltd.
had been assigned in 1973 to Land and Cattle Funding,

(McBride

deposition pages 9-11, exhibit 6; Jones deposition pages 9, 13, R.
at 250, 254), Land and Cattle Funding could not have had a negative
net worth at the time of the Divorce.

The uncontroverted facts

establish that this assertion is totally without merit.
In order to understand the nature and value of the interest
whose worth was allegedly misrepresented it is necessary to review
the status of three entities -- Geodyne II, Alpine Ltd. and, Land
and Cattle Funding.

Geodyne II, is the general partner in the

limited partnership Alpine Ltd.

In August of 1972 Mr. McBride

acquired a one-third interest in Geodyne II for $40,000 (McBride
deposition, p. 64).

Geodyne II owned approximately a 50% interest

in Alpine Ltd. and therefore, McBride's interest in Alpine Ltd.
through Geodyne II, was approximately 16% (McBride deposition, P·
64) •

In May of 1973, Mr. McBride sold a 6% interest in Alpine Ltd.
to Wendell Hansen for $25,000 (McBride deposition P· 64) •

The

-7-
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remainder of his original 16% interest (10%) was assigned to Land
and Cattle Funding in December of 1973,

(Jones deposition, pp.

9, 13, R. at 250, 254); McBride deposition, p. 9-12); McBride depo:
tion, Exhibit 6).
Land and Cattle Funding was an Idaho corporation whose sole
stockholders were Mr. McBride and the brother of Mrs. Jones,
Michael Telford.

Mr. McBride's contribution to Land and Cattle

Funding was valued at $125,000 and the corporate stock which he
received was allocated to him in accordance with that value (McBrk
deposition, p. 9-12).

From the time the interest in Alpine Ltd.

was assigned to Land and Cattle Funding it was consistently carriec
on the books and records of the corporation at $125,000.
Mrs. Jones' asserts that since the 10% in Alpine Ltd. was an
asset of Land and Cattle Funding at the time of the divorce, the
statement contained in Mr. Murphy's letter of December 6, 1976 is a
misrepresentation.

The only support which she has ever offered in

support of this assertion is that the assets of Alpine Ltd. were
sold in June of 1978 -- 18 months after the final Decree of Divorce

3/

for $7,500,000.-

She claims if a 10% interest in the assets of

3/ In footnote 1 of her brief Mrs. Jones states that "Alpine L~·
did not receive $7.5 million. Approximately $2.5 million i s · · ·
to be paid to plaintiff as a sales commission." This statement.
is simply untrue.
In February ~978 Mr. McB:r;:ide obtained an opti~:t
on the assets of Alpine Ltd. which he exercised in order to faci

-8-
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Alpine Ltd. was worth $750,000
the divorce,

(less liabilities) 18 months after

it had to be worth between $370,000 and $620,000 at

the time of the divorce (Answer to Plaintiff's Second Set of
Interrogatories,

2(b), R. at 115).

Mrs. Jones offers no evidence

of the value of the interest at the time of the divorce, but only
facts and circumstances which existed 18 months after the divorce.
In her attempts to rely on facts which existed 18 months after
the final Decree of Divorce, Mrs. Jones totally ignores the facts,
circumstances and information which were available to the parties
at the time of the divorce.

Facts existing at the time of the

divorce uncontrovertedly establish the accuracy of Mr. Murphy's
representation with respect to Land and Cattle Funding.

As noted

above, Mr. McBride paid only $40,000 for his entire 16% interest in
Alpine Ltd.

(McBride deposition, p. 64).

year later for $25,000

(Id.)

He in turn sold 6% one

Upon incorporation of Land and Cattle

Funding, he valued the remaining 10% at $125,000 (McBride deposition, p. 12).

The nature of these transactions offered every

incentive for Mr. McBride to place as high a value as possible on
his interest in Alpine Ltd.
Additional facts available at the time of the divorce demonstrate the accuracy of the representation with respect to Land and

The real estate sales agreea sale of the property at $7.5 million.
ment was subsequently assigned to Alpine Ltd. on November 30, 1978.
Mr. McBride did not and will not receive a commission of $2.5 million
on the sale of the Alpine Ltd. assets.
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Cattle Funding.

The business of Land and Cattle Funding was

primarily agricultural and due to a general recession in agriculture during 1974 Land and Cattle Funding sustained substantial
operating losses (McBride deposition, p. 16).

As a result, Land

and Cattle Funding was neither able to pay its loans to banks nor
to pay off other creditors and suppliers.

Indeed, the financial

condition of Land and Cattle Funding was so poor, that in Decembe:
of 1975, Mrs. Jones brother, Michael Telford, assigned all of the
stock he owned in Land and Cattle Funding to Mr. McBride and
abandoned the corporation believing it to be totally insolvent,

i;,

spite of the fact that the corporation still owned the 10% intern
in Alpine Ltd.

(McBride deposition pp. 31-32).

Mr. Telford reques:

no compensation for his stock, but insisted that Mr. McBride assur·
all debts and obligations of Land and Cattle Funding.

Thus, Mr.

McBride was left with a corporation which had substantial debts,
which he had personally guaranteed, and little means available in
the corporation to satisfy the debts.
During the later part of 1975 and throughout 1976, Mr. McBri:
attempted to offer Land and Cattle Funding' s interest in Alpine
Ltd. as security to First Security Bank of Idaho.

In all instanc:

the bank refused to accept the interest as security, considering·
to be unmarketable and inadequate as security.

Mr. McBride also

attempted to market the interest to private individuals and wu
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unsuccessful.

The problem being that the interest was not an

interest in any real property but rather was an interest in the
profits of the limited partnership (McBride deposition, pp. 73-75).
In addition to the severe financial difficulties facing Land
and Cattle Funding, limited partners in Alpine Ltd. began to
default in the latter months of 1976 raising the possibility that
the assets of Alpine Ltd. itself would be lost.

Thus, at the time

of the divorce, Mr. McBride owned all of the stock in Land and
Cattle Funding which was in extremely poor financial condition, the
only asset of which was an unmarketable interest in the profits of
a lirntied partnership which itself was facing financial difficulties.
At the time the final Decree of Divorce was entered between
these parties no partnership interest in Alpine Ltd. had ever been
resold by any of the original limited partners, except the interest
that Mr. McBride sold to Wendell Hansen.
market for such interests.

In fact, there was no

However, in June of 1977, five months

after the divorce, two 6% interests owned by the limited partner
Pace Industrial were sold.

The total sales price for the combined

12% interest was $160,000, an amount virtually identical to the

value at which the 10% interest had been carried on the books and
records of Land and cattle Funding (McBride deposition pp. 74-75) ·
Prior to the time of the final Decree of Divorce there had not been

-11-
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a single bona fide offer for the purchase of the assets of Al · .
Pln:
Ltd.
Hence, the record in this matter is totally void of any
evidence which supports the assertion that the statement "Stock
Land and Cattle Funding.

The corporation is in very poor condit:

and has a negative net worth" was anything but true and accurate.
The fact that the assets of Alpine Ltd. were sold 18 months afte:
ac~~

the divorce for a price of $7.5 million does not alter the
of the opinion at the time it was given.

In addition to the evidence which uncontrovertedly establisi,
that the representations made with respect to Land and Cattle
Funding and Alpine Ltd. were accurate, Mrs. Jones testified, dur:
the course of her deposition, that she did not rely upon the
statement which she now claims to be fraudulent (Jones depositioi.
pp. 57-58, R. at 298-299).

Not only did she testify that

she~

not rely on the statement but she further testified that it was
always her belief that the Alpine Ltd. asset had substantial val.
(Jones deposition pp. 29-30, R. at 270-271).

Additionally,

s~

testified that the reason she did not seek to obtain any of the
stock in Land and Cattle Funding, even though it contained the
Alpine Ltd. asset, was she knew, because of her brother's part1c:
pation in Land and Cattle Funding, that Land and Cattle Funding.,
encumbered with debt lJones deposition p. 44, R. at 285).
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Yet, at this time, even though all of the representations made
by Mr. McBride and his counsel were accurate, and even though Mrs.

Jones in her own words did not rely on the representation at
issue, and even though Mr. McBride spent two years satisfying
creditors and ultimately salvaging an asset of Land and Cattle
Funding and, even though the factors leading to the appreciation of
that interest occurred entirely subsequent to the final Decree of
Divorce, Mrs. Jones boldly seeks to obtain the fruits of the
efforts which Mr. McBride has undertaken since his divorce from
her in January 1977.
ARGUMENT
The uncontroverted facts in this action conclusively establish
that the trial court's order of summary judgment was proper and
must be affirmed by this court.

The facts establish, as a matter

of law, that insufficient grounds exist to set aside the final
judgment entered on January 13, 1977.

Specifically the uncontro-

verted facts establish that (1) even assuming for purposes of
argument that the representations at issue constitute fraud, such
representations constitute intrinsic fraud which is an insufficient
basis to set aside the final Decree of Divorce;

(2) Mrs. Jones

cannot prove a cause of action for fraud because a) she did not
rely upon any statements which she claims to be fraudulent and bl
the allegedly fraudulent statements were merely statements of
opinion and not representations of fact upon which an action for
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fraud can be maintained; and,

(3)

the representations at issue

were both truthful and accurate given the facts and circumstances
which existed at the time of the divorce.
I.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE REPRESENTATIONS
AT ISSUE WERE INACCURATE OR FRAUDULENT,
SUCH REPRESENTATIONS CONSTITUTE INTRINSIC
FRAUD FROM WHICH APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO
NO RELIEF FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE
DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED JANUARY 13, 1977.

The Decree of Divorce entered by this court on January 13,
1977 constitutes a final judgment, Sorenson v. Sorenson, 438 P.2d
180 (Utah 1968), which may not be upset upon the ground of fraud
if the alleged fraudulent representation constitutes what courts
have defined as intrinsic fraud.

In those cases in which courts

have addressed the issue of whether a final judgment should be
set aside or modified on the ground of fraud, they have unanimous~:
distinquished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud.

In so

distinquishing, the courts have unanimously held that only in
instances of extrinsic fraud is a claimant entitled to relief.
Clissold v.

Clissold, 519 P.2d 241 (Utah 1974); Haner v. Haner,

373 P.2d 577 (Utah 1962); Glover v. Glover, 242 P.2d 298 (Utah
1952); Rice v.

Rice, 212 P.2d 685

(Utah 1949).

In Clissold, supra, this Court, relying on the distinction
between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, denied a former wife's
motion to modify the property settlement aspects of the Decreeoi

-14-
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Divorce.

The movant in Clissold sought to set aside the final

judgment on the ground of fraud asserting that an interrogatory
had been falsely answered.

After recognizing that in certain

instances fraudulent misrepresentations may provide a basis for
setting aside a final divorce decree, the court stated:
. . . however, before relief can be granted, it must be
determined that the alleged misrepresentation or concealment constitutes conduct, such as fraud, as would basically
afford the complaining party relief from the judgment. The
proper disposition of this case requires an analysis and
discussion of the concepts of "intrinsic" and "extrinsic"
fraud.
The public interest requires that there be an end
to litigation.
To accomplish this objective the courts
have always distinquished between the actions of a party
litigant which bear upon the opposing party's opportunity
for a fair submission of his case and a party's misrepresentation during trial.
Those actions asserted to be
fraudulent which prevent a fair submission of the controversy such as deceiving a party into not filing an answer
or deceiving a party into staying away from court on the
day of the trial are classed as extrinsic fraud, and if
existent in fact, entitle the opposing party to relief
from the judgment. Conduct asserted to be fraudulent
which occurs during the course of the proceedings, such
as false testimony, whether or not existent in fact, does
not entitle a party to relief from the judgment. The
principal, of course, is that during a trial veracity
itself is on trial, and in the public interest cannot be
tried again.
Some exceptions to this rule exist in
divorce cases where there has been a gross misrepresentation of assets by a party. Such does not appear
in the case at bar. At most there was a dispute as
to the value of some highly speculative property and
an answer to an interrogatory, even if untrue, would
be no different than a false answer during trial, and
would therefore come within the classification of
intrinsic fraud, not entitling the opposing party to the
relief.
559 P.2d at 242 (Emphasis original, except last
sentence) •

-15-
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Similarly, in Haner, supra this court faced the same issues
and again refused to reverse the trial court's refusal to modify:
decree of divorce because the fraud alleged was intrinsic

fra~.

In Haner the court discussed the issues as follows:
It is sometimes said that when a judgment is attacked collaterally on the ground that it was obtained by fraud or
deceit it will be set aside only for extrinsic fraud. But
we are in accord with the indications in the restatement
of judgments that this is too limited.
It seems more
realistic to say that when it appears that the process of
justice has been so completely thwarted or distorted as
to persuade the court that in fairness and good conscience
the judgment should not be permitted to stand, relief
should be granted.
However, inasmuch as the plaintiff
here seems to be relying on the ground as fraud, there
is a distinction which it is necessary to point out.
In order to justify granting relief, the alleged wrong
would have to be of the type characterized as extrinsic
fraud: that is, fraud based on conduct or activities
outside of the court proceedings themselves; and which
is designed and has the effect of depriving the other
party of the opportunity to present his claim or defense.
This type of fraud which is regarded as a fraud not only
upon the opponent, but upon the court itself, can be
accomplished in a number of ways, such as making false
statements or representations to the other party or to
witnesses to prevent them from contesting the issues;
or by that means or otherwise preventing the attendance .
of the parties for witnesses; or by destroying or secreting
evidence; so that a fair trial of the issues is effectiveU
prevented.
It is obvious that quite a different situation where there
is no prevention of the party from contesting the issues
in a trial and where the complaint is simply that one
party pres~nted prejured testimony or false eviden7e.
This charge is simply a continuation of the s~me dispute
which the trial was supposed to resolve.
It is the purpose
of the law to afford the parties full opportunity to have
themselves and their witnesses present; and to present theH
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evidence and their contentions to the court. When this has
been done and the court has made its determination, that
should end the matter, except for the right of appeal.
It
is so patent as to hardly justify comment that a judgment
should not be set aside merely to grant the losing party
another chance to accomplish the task at which he just
failed: to prove that he was right and the opponent was
wrong.
To reopen a case just because a party persists
in asserting and attempting to prove that his version
of the dispute was the truth and that of the opponent
was false would open the door to a repetition of that
procedure, whoever won the next time; and thus to
keeping the dispute going ad infinitum with no way
of determing when the merry-go-round of the lawsuit
would end.
This would involve not only a waste of
time, energy and expense but also would result in
such uncertainty as to the peoples right that the
very purpose of the lawsuit, the settling of disputes
and putting them at rest, would be defeated. Resort
to the courts would be frustrating and unpractical
unless there were some point at which decisions become
final so that the parties can place reliance thereon,
leave their troubles behind and proceed to the future.
It is for these reasons that courts accord to judgments
regularly entered a high degree of sanctity; and would
overturn a judgment such as the instant one on the
ground of fraud only if it were shown that the complaining party had been wrongfully deprived of the opportunity
to meet and contest the issues at the trial.
The averment set out in plaintiff's affidavit are to
the effect that the defendant has, since the trial,
admitted the accusations made in his pleadings and
at the trial concerning her associations with other
men were not true; and that erroneous values were
placed on some of their properties.
Inasmuch as
the parties and their witnesses were present and these
issues were contested during the trial, if there were
in fact misrepresentations and fraud, as plaintiffs claim,
they would have occured within the trial itself (thus
intrinsic to it) and therefore would not have been
the type of fraud characterized as extrinsic fraud,
explained above.
In view of the principles herein
discussed, the trial court correctly rules that
plaintiff's charges would provide no basis upon which
to set aside judgment.
373 P.2d at 578-579.
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The issues presented by the petition of Mrs. Jones and the
facts alleged are virtually identical to those addressed by ~~
court in both Clissold and Haner.

However, the alleged misrepre·

sentation in this instance is not in the form of a false answer to
an interrogatory as in the Clissold case, nor it is an admittedly
false representation in a pleading as in the Haner case; rather it
is merely a statement of opinion contained in a letter exchanged
between counsel.

Appellant argues that even though one is not

entitled to relief from fraudulent representations contained in
answers to interrogatories nor from fraudulent statements contair.E'
in other pleadings, one is, nevertheless, entitled to relief if
information contained in a letter between counsel appears inaccura·
in the light of circumstances existing 18 months later.
It is untenable to argue, as appellant does that because the
representations at issue were contained in a letter between couns•
rather than in a formal pleading, the alleged misrepresentation is
transformed from intrinsic fraud into extrinsic fraud.

The

letters at issue herein were exchanged between counsel during the
course of the adversary and judicial proceeding surrounding the
divorce between the parties and were as intrinsic to those procee'.
ings as any interrogatory or other pleading exchanged between
counsel.

To allow appellant to set aside the final judgment in

this matter would be an incentive to counsel to seek discovery by
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informal means rather than formal pleading, as a method of avoiding finality of judgments.

The fact that appellants counsel

choose to proceed by letter rather than by formal interrogatory
should not allow her to avoid the finality of the judgment in
question.
Appellant's reliance on Glover v. Glover, 242 P.2d 298 (Utah

1952) in support of her contention that the alleged fraud in this
case was extrinsic, is misplaced.

In Glover, the plaintiff was

induced not to seek a distribution of certain property in the
divorce decree, and did not bring certain property to the court's
attention because of her reliance on a private agreement which
defendant had no intention of keeping.

This Court determined that

the "false promise of a compromise" constituted extrinsic fraud.

242 P.2d at 300.
In this case no false promise of a compromise exists.
asset in question
closed and contested.

The

stock in Land and Cattle Funding -- was disMrs. Jones, with the aid of her counsel,

had every opportunity to examine the validity of the opinion of
Mr. McBride and his cou:csel with respect to Land and Cattle Funding; and, thus, had ample opportunity to litigate the matters
which she now raises.

Indeed, neither Mr. McBride nor his counsel

made any statement which deprived Mrs. Jones of the opportunity to
contest the matters which she now wishes to litigate years after
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they were laid to rest.

Hrs. Jones, of her own volition, choose

not to litigate in January of 1977 because, in her own words,
Mr. McBride agreed in the stipulation at issue to give her "every-

thing which she requested"

(Jones deposition pp. 84-85, R. at 3&

326).

The fact that appellant's counsel saw fit not to ask a
single interrogatory, nor request a single document via Rule 34

0:

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor to take a single deposihor
must not be allowed as a means of circumventing the finality of
the Decree of Divorce.

The letters and negotiations between

counsel for the respective parties were instrinsic to the judicia:
proceedings surrounding the divorce and, thus, do not constitute:
sufficient basis to set aside the final Decree of Divorce.

This

Court's conclusion in Clissold, supra, is dispositive,
At most there was a dispute as to the value of some
highly speculative property, and an answer to an interrogatory [or information contained in a letter exchanged
between counsel], even if untrue, would be no different
than a false answer during trial, and would therefore
come within the classification of intrinsic fraud, not
entitling the opposing party to relief.
592 P.2d at
242.
Hence, the trial court's order of summary judgment must be
affirmed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MUST BE AFFIRMED SINCE, AS A MATTER OF LAW,
APPELLANT CANNOT PROVE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
FRAUD.

This court has on a number of occasions enumerated the
elements which must be proven in order to establish a cause of
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action for fraud.

The elements are as follows:

L

That the representation was made.

2.

That the reeresentation concerned an existing: material

3.

That the representation was false.

4.

That the person making the representation knew it to be

~

false.
5.

That the representation was made to induce action.

6.

That the other party acted on the representation reasonably

and in ignorance of its falsity.
7.

That the other party did in fact rely on the statement.

8.

That he was induced to act.

9.

That he thereby suffered injury and damage.

Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952); Stuck v. Delta Land
& Water Company, 227 P.2d 291 (1924).

If a claimant fails to

establish any one of the elements identifed above, the cause of
action for fraud must fail.
In this instance, Mrs. Jones cannot establish two essential
elements.

First, by her own testimony she did not rely upon the

statements which she alleges to be fraudulent.

Second, the repre-

sentations at issue were merely statements of opinion and as such
were not representations of fact sufficient to support an action
for fraud.
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A.

Assuming respondents representations with
:espect to Land and Cattle Funding were
inaccurate, appellant cannot prove a cause
of action for fraud because she did not
rely upon the representations made by
respondent.

The testimony of Mrs. Jones conclusively demonstrates that
her action for fraud must fail as a matter of law.

By her own

testimony she did not rely upon the statements which she alleges
to be false.

The following testimony taken from her deposition

1:

conclusive:
Question: At the time you decided not to take any stock
in Land and Cattle Funding did you rely on the statement
that the corporation had a negative net worth?
Answer: No, I did not rely on that statement.
Question:

Did you rely on your counsel?

Answer: As far as Land and Cattle Funding was concerned,
it was a joint
I decided I didn't want that.

* * *
Question:
Did you read this document [December 6th
letter from Mr. Murphy to Mr. Henroid] and see the
statement, "the corporation has a negative net worth,"
and as a result of reading this statement say "I don't
want any of that stock"?
Answer:
Not as a result of just that, no.
(Jones deposition, p. 57-58, R. at 298-299).
Thus, it is clear from the testimony of Mrs. Jones, herself,
that she cannot substantiate an action for fraud because there wa:
simply no reliance by her on the alleged fraudulent statement.
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In addition to her own testimony the facts in this record
demonstrate that there was simply no reliance by Mrs. Jones upon
any representation made by Mr. McBride or his counsel.

Indeed, it

was because Mrs. Jones did not believe she could rely upon Mr.
McBride that she retained the services of her present counsel to
set aside and renegotiate the original property settlement agreement which she executed.
Since appellant did not rely upon the representations at
issue, she cannot, as a matter of law, prove an action for fraud
and, therefore the trial court's order of swnmary judgment must be
affirmed.
B.

Appellant cannot maintain an action
for fraud based upon the representations at issue since they were merely
statements of respondent's opinions
and were not representations of fact.

In his letter to Mr. Murphy of December 26, 1976, Mr. Henroid
requested that he be furnished "with a list of assets in trust and
their estimated values" and with a "list of assets not in trust."
With respect to the assets not in trust Mr. Henroid did not even
request an opinion as to their value.

However, since Mr. Henroid

had requested opinions as to the value of the assets held in
trust, Mr. McBride and his counsel also provided, in the letter of
December 6, 1976, opinions with respect to the assets not held in
trust.

The statement contained in the December 6, 1976 letter
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from Mr. Murphy to Mr. Henroid to the effect that Land and Cattle
Funding was in very poor condition and had a negative net worth
constitutes nothing more than the opinion of Mr. McBride and his
counsel as to what they believed the value of that stock to be at
the date in question.
This court has held in Oberg v. Saunders, 184 P. 2d 229 (Utah
1947) that "representations as to value are expressions of opinior.
and cannot form the basis of an action fraud.

184 P. 2d at 234.

Similarly in Davis v. Schiess, 417 P.2d 19 (Wyo. 1966) the Wyomin~
Supreme Court held:
Since the early days of this court, it has followed the
general rule that an expression of opinion as to value
is not fraud.
Otherwise stated a statement which is
but an opinion is generally not held to be a representation of fact. . . . an honest opinion as to value is
not a fraudulent misrepresentation.
417 P.2d at 291.
In his letter of November 26 Mr. Henroid asked for nothing
more than Mr. McBride's estimates or opinions as to the value of
certain assets; and, in light of the circumstances which existed a:
the time, Mr. McBride provided what he believed to be honest and
fair opinions as to the values of the respective assets.

Given

the severe financial troubles which afflicted Land and Cattle
Funding during the entire divorce proceedings, it is untenable to
even suggest that Mr. McBride misrepresented the viability of the
corporation or the financial hardship which Land and Cattle Fundir
was encountering.

In short, the representation made by Mr. McBrk
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and his counsel with respect to the financial status of Land and
cattle Funding was a totally accurate and truthful representation
of their opinion as to the corporation's financial status.
However, regardless of the accuracy of the opinions in
question, they were just that -- opinions.

As such, they were

not statements of fact sufficient to support an action for fraud,
or.

:o

!if.

and, therefore, the trial court's order of summary judgment must
be affirmed.
III. THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS IN THIS RECORD
CONCLUSIVELY DEMONSTRATE THAT MR. McBRIDE
COMMITTED NO FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION OF
FACT, NOR ANY KNOWING CONCEALMENT OF FACT,
BECAUSE THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY HIM
WHICH APPELLANT CLAIMS WAS FRAUDULENT
WAS IN FACT TRUTHFUL AND ACCURATE
The entire basis of Mrs. Jones' claim for relief in this
matter is that the following representation contained in the letter
dated December 6, 1976 from Mr. Murphy to Mr. Henroid constituted
a fraudulent misrepresentation at the time the parties entered into
the stipulation for the division of property between them:
Stock and Land and Cattle Funding. At this time
the corporation is in very poor condition and
has a negative net worth.
To the contrary, all of the evidence in the record uncontrovertedly establishes that from late 1974 and continuing until well
after the divorce between these parties, Land and Cattle Funding
encountered severe financial difficulty which ultimately led to
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the revocation of its corporate charter.

The record is also

cl~

that the Alpine Ltd. asset owned by Land and Cattle Funding did
not significantly improve the financial posture of Land and Catti;
Funding since it was merely a limited partnership interest (not a:
interest in real property) and as such was unmarketable.

Moreove:

Alpine Ltd. itself was experiencing difficulties due to the def au:
of its own limited partners.

With these circumstances in mind

there was no reason for Mr. McBride, nor his counsel, to be optirn·
istic about the value of Land and Cattle Funding.
Mrs. Jones has asserted repeatedly that the statement "the
corporation is in very poor condition and has a negative net
worth" is tantamount to saying Land and Cattle Funding' s interest
in Alpine Ltd. was worthless.

Such an assertion is simply not

tenable, especially in light of her rep re sen ta ti on by sophisticat;
counsel.
Mr.

The fact of the matter is that at the time of the divor:

McBride did not own a 10% interest in the real property owned

by Alpine Ltd.

He owned stock in Land and Cattle Funding which

owned a 10% limited partnership interest in Alpine Ltd.

The

stock of Land and Cattle Funding was of little value because ~e
liabilities and potential liabilities of the corporation were
greater than the value which Mr. McBride believed the assets
of Land and cattle Funding represented.

Moreover, since Mr.

McBride had been unsuccessful in selling the 10% limited partner·
ship interest he had no reason to believe that it added signi-

-26Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ficantly to the net worth of Land and Cattle Funding.
The facts and circumstances which existed at

th~

time of the

divorce clearly demonstrate that the representations made by Mr.
McBride and his counsel concerning Land and Cattle Funding were
both truthful and accurate.

It is futile for appellant to attempt

to raise an issue of fact with respect to value of Land and Cattle
Funding with evidence of facts and circumstances that came into
existence some 18 months after the final Decree of Divorce was
entered.

This record is totally void of any evidence which indicates

that Mr. McBride had any reason to believe that Land and Cattle
Funding, even with its ownership interest in Alpine Ltd., had any
significant value at the time these parties were divorced.
In short, the representations at issue were both true and
accurate, and, therefore, the trial court's order of sununary
judgment must be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the order of summary judgment
entered by the trial court must be affirmed.
DATED this

111/1.day of February, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two true and
accurate copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief, postage
prepaid, to Joseph L. Henroid and Earl Jay Peck of and for Nielse
Henroid, Gottfredson & Peck, 400 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111 this 11th day of February, 1980.
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